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RATIONALITY IN THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Abstract

The paper researches the perspective, the extent, the meaning and the dimension of terrorism when it is interpreted as rational strategic choice of political struggle. It also observes if the modalities of understanding the aspect of rationality in the phenomenon of terrorism may affect the counterterrorism concepts. Since terrorism is a political strategy (followed by a tactical choice of methods and means) this phenomenon must be determined by aspect of rationality. There is a variety of possible ways to estimate the influence of the element of rationality in this phenomenon but it is not possible to interpret it in a one-dimensional way. The question of rationality can be reduced to the category of interest, but considering the complexity of terrorism, this proposition could be treated as a vulgarization. It is shown that terrorism has its own internal logic which is reflected in its etiology, phenomenology and morphology – therefore in the aspect of rationality. This rationality is both comparable to processes in other areas of society and specific in many aspects. The aspect of rationality is inextricably linked both with the causes and motivations of terrorist activities, as well as the group dynamics inside terrorist organizations. The presentation of the causes of terrorism contributes to the understanding of aspects of rationality and affect counterterrorism concept, although correlations are not simple and direct. The analysis has therefore included the problem of identity, the observation of terrorism as a mean of social and political influence, as well as the ethical aspects of (counter)terrorism. We need to be able to avoid our exclusiveness in order to interpret the fanaticism of others – which is usually irrational from the standpoint of our principles and values and at the same time perfectly rational in the thought and value system of the others – because it is the only way to define adequate countermeasures.

1. EPISTEMOLOGY FRAME AND OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER

Explanations of terrorism as a multidimensional phenomenon can be limited by political favoritism, social prejudices, ideological prism, or a theoretical perspective – which is reflected in the field of counterterrorism. Internal logic of terrorism confronts the views and interpretations, therefore the problem is to formulate a theoretical model that would clearly and consistently operationalize the key categories an determine the exact scope and extent of their impact on terrorism: on the level at which an individual or a group or organization is the crucial factor (especially the leader), or on a level of our immediate and distant environment. During the construction of the theoretical model it is not possible, as in mathematics, to extend the validity and application of established principles within the uncharted fields (aspects). What is the way to connect causal factors? Many options of interpretation are opened, but terrorism remains a complex phenomenon whose roots and effects, as well as the modalities of its prevention, can only be analyzed taking into account the multidisciplinary approach – whereby the perspective put emphasis on certain aspects – with outstanding theoretical pluralism. In this paper, we basically support multi-causal concept, but we also put the emphasis on the analysis of the teleological element[1] – and the political dimension of terrorism itself (because, politics is always teleological activity). While we takes into consideration:

"Any theory that emphasizes the purposive quality of human behavior is likely to be criticizes as being "teleological". That label should be avoided if only because it gives rise to extreme arguments, as then Catton (1966, pp. 5, 11) dismisses teleological theories or explanation on the grounds that they have some future state (a goal)

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[1] Gibbs P. Jack, "Conceptualization of terrorism", in *Terrorism studies: a reader*, edited by John Horgan andd Kurt Braddock, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, p. 65: "The present definition indicates that terrorists necessarily have a goal. Even though it is difficult to think of a human action that is not goal oriented, the consideration is controversial for two reasons. One reason is the allegation that terrorists are irrational or mentally ill (see, e.g., Livingston 1987, pp. 224-239; and Livigstone's commentary, 1982, p. 31 on Parry), which raises doubts as to whether terrorists have identifiable goals. The second reason why part 1 of the definition is controversial: many sociologists, especially Durkheimias, do not emphasize the purposive quality of human behavior, perhaps because they view the emphasize as reductionism. In any case, a defensible definition of virtually any terms in sociology's vocabulary requires recognition of the relevance of internal behavior (e.g., perception, beliefs, purpose). Thus, without part 1 of the preset definition, the distinction between terrorism and the typical robbery becomes obscure".

causing present behavior. However, the term "purposiveness" is not used here as a synonym for "teleological"; instead, it is used to denote all major types of internal behavior, such as perception and belief, the argument being that such behaviors enter into the pursuit of goals. Identification of "purposiveness" as a explanatory mechanism is consistent with symbolic interactionism, one of sociology's perennial major perspectives"[2].

Contemporary views in the first place define terrorism as political violence and a strategy (tactics) of political struggle – that may shows analysis of frequencies of definitional elements of terrorism[3]. Since terrorism is inseparable from the political sphere way of understanding the dimension of rationality in the phenomenon of terrorism is extremely important. Therefore, we research the perspective, the extent, the meaning and the dimension of terrorism when it is interpreted as rational strategic choice of a political struggle. We also observe if the modalities of understanding the aspect of rationality in the phenomenon of terrorism may affect the counterterrorism concepts[4]. Approved the following definition of terrorism:

"Modern political terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and it can be theoretically and generally defined as: a complex form of organized group, and less individual or institutional political violence, marked not only by frightening brachial physical and psychological but also sophisticated technological methods of political

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2 Ibidem, pp. 69-70.

3 See closer: Weinberg Leonard, Pedahzur Ami and Hirsch-Hoefler Sivan, "The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism", in *Terrorism studies: a reader*, edited by John Horgan andd Kurt Braddock, Routledge, London and New York, 2012. It is very interesting segment, Ibidem, p. 79: "A brief examination of table 5.1 reveals wide differences in the relative strength of the 22 definitional elements Schmid reports when compared to the journal contributors' suggested definitions. In two instances, elements 9 ("extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints") and 12 ("arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscriminate"), which emergent as important constituents of Schmid's definition, received no mention at all in the relevant journal articles. Another element, 10 ("coercion, extortion, induction of compliance"), which appeared in 28 percent of the definition in Schmid's survey, was mentioned in less than 6 percent of the journal definitions... The journal-based definitions were also much less likely to mention the arousal of fear and terror (elements 3) and "psychological effects and anticipated reactions" (element 5) as important components. In general, then, the journal contributors placed much less emphasis on the psychological aspects".

4 Stohl Michael, "The Global War on Terror and State Terrorism", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *Special Issue: Under - Investigated topics in terrorism research*, June 2008, p. 8, http://www.terrorismanalysts. com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=publication&id=1&Itemid=, 30.04.2015.: "… al-Qaeda (and violent jihadis in general) was characterized as apocalyptic and hateful, devoid of reasonable political aims, interested only in death and destruction and thus incapable of rational thought or political bargaining... the obvious strategic conclusion is that they must be eliminated because they cannot be neutralized or moderated".

struggle. That usually means, especially during the political and economic crisis and rarely during economic and political stability of the society, that we have to try systematically to achieve 'great goals'. Sometimes we do that in a morbidly spectacular way, inappropriate to certain conditions, such as social situation or historical possibilities of those who practice it as a political strategy"[5].

Counterterrorism(CT) is a term that denotes a system of both public and confidential (defensive and offensive, proactive and reactive) measures, actions and activities of the state or political and military alliances aimed to protect themsleves and their citizens from terrorism, on the basis of normative principles, guidelines, objectives and strategic priorities of action – including the commitments made through international agreements – with the resources and established institutions responsible for their implementation, in correlation with the political, and based on it, security (and military) concept within the given structure of international relations and manifested (global, regional and local) security trends, geopolitical position and geostrategic interests, as well as the relationships that given political entity builds with relevant international actors[6].

2. MODALITIES OF ANALYSIS

Writing about frustration as the cause of terrorism Vojin Dimitrijevic draws attention that it is "not enough that there is a really bad situation, it is necessary that it should be perceived in a certain way and compared with the desired better condition". It is a "gap between someone's desires and achievements" therefore "the etiology of terrorism is likely to be found in this field. It also refers not only to a single cause or to the accumulation of multiple causes but also to the relationship between several causes... We must not get carried away by our expectation as we reveal some of the generally valid reasons... As specific anomic acts, they are hardly predictable and owe much to the personal factors". He believes that it is useful to "seek the *general conditions* that make terrorism probable, but not *certain*". He also notes that the problem is to make operating concepts and points out that the methodological prolific term is systemic frustration that "should mark the

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5 Simeunović Dragan, *Terrorism*, Faculty of Law, Belgrade, 2009, p. 80.
6 Павлићевић Предраг, "Слабе државе и блиски концепти као компонента безбедносне и контратерористичке стратегије", *Војно дело*, вол. 65, бр. 4, 2013, pp. 129-130.

relationship between the creation of social desire (aspiration) and the degree of social satisfaction"[7].

Jeffrey Ian Ross (1999) "considers that terrorism can be conceptualized by putting it in the form in which the social structure is combined with a group psychology. The structural factors and psychological structure of potentially violent people, effect each other and produce terrorism"[8].

Luis de la Corte points out: that exists three basic approaches to studying terrorism – macrosociological, psychological and psychosocial theoretical perspectives; that „neither the individual psychology of terrorists, nor the social environments provide a complete explanation of why individuals become involved in terrorism"; that ever greater number of researchers turn to social psychology perspective, and proposes seven principles for understanding terrorism, some of which are especially useful for our topic[9].

It is emphasized that[10] – taking into account that terroirism is conditioned by multiple factors – it is nearly impossible to explain this phenomenon in a single model (that it, not a single approach does not offer full explanation about causes of terrorism), therefore, generally speaking, there are *four analytical approaches*: 1)

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7 Војин Димитријевић, *Terorizam*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1982, p. 180. This is an evaluation that can be exposed to several objections. Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", in *Terrorism studies: a reader*, edited by John Horgan andd Kurt Braddock, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, p. 102: "This is not to say, however, that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is a necessary or a sufficient cause of terrorism. Not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect objective social or economic deprivation. In West Germany, Japan, and Italy, for example, terrorism has been the chosen method of the privileged, not the downtrodden. Some theoretical studies have suggested that the essential ingredient that must be added to real deprivation is the perception on the part of the deprived that this condition is not what they deserve or expect, in short, that discrimination is unjust. An attitude study, for example, found that 'the idea of justice or fairness may be more centrally related to attitudes toward violence than are feelings of deprivation. It is the perceived injustice underlying the deprivation that gives, rise to anger or frustration.' The intervening variables… lie in the terrorists' perceptions. Moreover, it seems likely that for terrorism to occur the government must be singled out to blame for popular suffering".

8 Vajt R. Džonatan, *Terorizam*, Alexandria press, Beograd, 2004, pp. 33-34. Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition of the monography. Please refer to the bibliography for further details.

9 Luis de la Corte, "Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach", *Perspectives on Terrorism,* Vol 1, No 2, 2007, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/ article/view/8/ html, 06.11.2014., pages not marked.

10 Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk, *Transnational terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law*, Deliverable 5, WP 3, Dec. 2008, http://www.transnationalterrorism. eu/tekst/ publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf , 10.04.2015.

Multi-Causal Approach that entails several causal variables for understanding of terrorism – encompassing psychological considerations, economic, political, religious and sociological factors; 2) *Political or Structural Approach* detects causes of terrorism into environmental factors, turns attention to poverty, oppression and inequality, entails identification of preconditions of those factors in environment that contribute to individuals joining terrorism[11]; 3) *Rational or Organizational Approach* characterized by the focus on terrorism as a rational strategic choice – based on the statement „that organizations consciously make the decision to use the instrument of terrorism as the best option to attain certain political goals" – followers of this approch asserts that terrorism is not the product of individual decisions or personal developments, but the result of a group process and its collective rational decisions[12]; 4) *Psychological Approach*.

Bjørn Møller methodological framework for reaching the phenomenon of terrorism is established via three levels of analysis, with departing point being:

„... the distinction between individual terrorist, terrorist groups and leaders, and terrorist constituencies or environments. These levels of analysis might be labelled either unit, group and system or micro, meso and macro… In analogy with Kenneth Waltz's admonitions against 'reductionism', the assumption is that we shall need different (lumps of) theory to explain (and by implication, predict, in order to prevent) the relevant factors at the three levels. Whereas something may speak in favour of heuristically assuming and then testing (rather than taking for granted) a certain isomorphism between entities at the same level of analysis (different organisations, for instance), to assume such an isomorphism between entities at different levels of analysis (such as organisations and their members) is definitely

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11 It is underlined, Ibidem, pp. 13-14, that Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 2006) points out notion of *relative deprivation* that refers to the feelings of economic, political, or social deprivation caused by the inability to get what it considers to be just – that provokes a feelings of frustration and causes collective violence.

12 It is considered, Ibidem, p. 14, that these assumptions are "highly speculative since hardly any empirical studies have provided evidence of how decisions are reached collectively in terrorist groups", as well as that emphasizes Hudson (1999) „организациони приступ може више бити од значаја за групе традиционалних структура са јасним ланцима команде него за лабаве терористичке мреже". It is poited out, Ibidem, pp. 7-8, that Martha Crenshaw points out the difficulty of finding general explanations for terrorism, that terrorism is a product of rational political choice and "that patterns of terrorism may be a consequence of strategic conceptions rather than a set of common circumstances or conditions".

not permissible, in fact would be tantamount to confusing the whole with the sum of its parts"[13].

We will utilize the abovementioned theoretical model.

3. MICRO LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Psychological approach takes into consideration motivation of individuals that resort to terrorism, deals with personalities, beliefs and attitudes of terrorists, focuses on the functions and characteristics of individual as actor. Some scientists, considering the causes of terrorist activities, focus on motivation of terrorists or group processes, but it is evaluated that such an approach is characterized by the lack of arguments and explanations on an aggregate level[14].

Bjørn Møller points out that "even though the typical popular image of the terrorist, at least in the West… (usually Muslim) fanatic, empirical studies do not generally support this image". Møller examines the question of personal motives for execution of an terrorist act, ideal situation of identification of potential terrorists by establishing typical profile of a terrorist. He refers to "... 'typical' rank-and-file terrorist (as opposed to the leaders)... unmarried, come from middle-class backgrounds, and they are often well-educated but unemployed, or employed in jobs below their educational level" – at the same time a cunning, capable, enterprising and ruthless person. Møller discusses methodological problems of profiling in objective diversity of executors and forms of attack, and refer to the need to make a distinction between the objectives of terrorist attack and mental characteristics of the perpetrator. He emphasizes that on microsocial level it is possible *to explain terrorism as more emotional than rationally motivated* (based on rational choice theory that can to reconstruct the choice of targets, tactics and instruments for their

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13 Møller Bjørn, "Terror prevention and development aid: what we know and don't know", *DIIS Report 2007:3*, Danish Institute for international studies, Copenhagen, http://subweb.diis.dk/ graphics/ Publications/Reports2006/diisreport-2007-3.pdf, 06.11.2014., p. 30.

14 Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk, pp. 9-10, 14-15. It is underlined, Ibidem, that Bruce Hoffman (1999) finds "several common traits, including strategic targeting and the undeniable belief in the ultimate triumph over their enemies" and that "terrorists live in the divinely decreed future, a point in time where the ultimate realization of their political destiny can be attained". While Jerrold Post "criticizes those who regard terrorism as a course of action and a deliberate choice among different alternatives. Post argues that '... political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit'(1990: 25)".

fulfillment – where it is "conceivable that some terrorists are more rational than others"), and that is "possible to combine the two approaches"[15]. Møller explains motivational processes via polyvalent links and (mutual) influences of rational, *emotions, values and beliefs, psychology, agresivenes and other incentives that lead to a* terrorist act – as an act of perfectly normal and rational person making a rational choice[16].

Marc Sageman also considers that "the main problem of explaining terrorism through pathology of personality is... the lack of relevant data" and that "the thesis of the pathology of personality suffers from fundamental problems of specificity" and "not relevant when it comes to global Salafist jihad"[17]. Sageman argues:

"... Although antisocial personalities can become individual terrorists, they will not go well in a terrorist organization... they would miss dedication, perseverance and ability to sacrifice for the cause, which requires very spectacular martyrdom. In group activities they probably could not be coordinated with others and there-

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15 Møller Bjørn, op. cit., pp. 31-36, 40.

16 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., pp. 106-107: "As most simply and frequently posed, the question of a psychological explanation of terrorism is whether or not there is a "terrorist personality," similar to the authoritarian personality, whose emotional traits we can specify with some exactitude. An identifiable pattern of attitudes and behavior in the terrorism-prone individual would results from a combination of ego-defensive needs, cognitive processes, and socialization, in interaction with a specific situation. In pursing this line of inquiry, it is important to avoid stereotyping the terrorist or oversimplifying the source of terrorist actions. No single motivation or personality can be valid for all circumstances. What limited data we have on individual terrorists (and knowledge must be gleaned from disparate sources that usually neither focus on psychology nor use a comparative approach) suggested that the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists in their normality. Terrorism often seems to be the connecting link among widely varying personalities. Franco Venturi, concentrating on the terrorists of a single small group, observed that "the policy of terrorism united many very different characters and mentalities"... Peter Merkl, in his study of the pre-1933 Nazi movement-a study based on much more data that we have on terrorist-abandoned any attempt to classify personality types and instead focused on factors like the level of political understanding. An unbiased examination of conscious attitudes might be more revealing than a study of subconscious predispositions or personalities".

17 Sejdžmen Mark, *Terorističke mreže*, Beograd, Udruženje diplomaca Centra Džordž K. Maršal: Altera, 2006., pp. 80–81. Ibidem, pp. 72–73: "... As defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association, the data confirm the absence of serious mental disorders among terrorists... From sixty one person about whose childhood I had partial information, only four there are evidenced with the behavioral disorders". Sageman also deals with the problem of pathological narcissism and paranoia, and he notes that "the thesis remains speculation that is not supported by any empirical evidence" (See closer Ibidem, pp. 78–79). Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition of the monography . Please refer to the bibliography for further details.

fore would be a disturbing factor and incapable for discipline... We may here raise the claim that, in an organized operation that requires great personal sacrifice, those who are not able to do an individual harm, are usually most willing to do it collectively"[18].

When analyzing the phenomenon of Salafi Jihad Sageman constantly introduces socio-psychological determinants[19]. Sageman suggests that inability to fit into the social environment, alienation from the local population and naive enthusiasm for the ideal of virtual jihad may make people blind to reality, as they follow a logic of abstract ideology and apocalyptic notion of global war between good and evil. He shows that joning jihad is not simply a decision but a (rarely consciouss) process of transformation of a small group of people tied by common origin, education and belief. Clique arise from isolated individuals into a community of fanatics "through friendship, kinship, respect and discipleship", that "deepen mutual relations in a spiral of increasing loyalty, mutual commitment, self-sacrifice and intimacy", where the "process is rarely consciouss". The intensity of beliefs that produce violence grows in the game of prestige within the group, which results in joining jihad[20]. Sageman notes that *cliques are not global*: "Although a common profile may be defined within a single clique, it is not generated in the social movement as a whole".

The importance of individuality for examining the aspect of rationality in the phenomenon of terrorism is observable in the analysis *Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism* by the European Union – where it is defined as the constitutive part of counterterrorism policy of the Union. In one EU's security study[21] it is proposed that radical behavior is caused by the combination of individual and social factors, and that external factors can create an environment where radicalization of individuals is stronger but that their influence should not be overstated. It is concluded that the creators of politics have overly

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18 Ibidem, p. 73.

19 For example, Ibidem, pp. 85-86, 129-134.

20 Ibidem, p. 85: "The Arabs who have grown up in the central Arabian countries come from the society with developed social life and they belong to a religion that greatly affects the public and social life. They were isolated when they moved from their families and friends ... And, the lack of spirituality in a culture that is guided by the principle of utility is largely experienced. Unemployed and at the same time discriminated by the local society, forced them to create a personal feeling of resentment and humiliation".

21 The EU Counterradicalization Strategy: Evaluating EU policies concerning couses of radicalization, *Transnational terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law*, Workpackage 4, objective 6, May 2008, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/EU%20 Counterradicalization%20Strategy.pdf, 10.03.2015.

focused on discovering causes of radicalization in external factors, such as pliical and economic conditions, and that such an evaluation is valid also for the EU because its strategy nearly does not mention addressing causes of radicalization on an individual level. It is stated that psychological causes of radicalization are not mentioned in the EU's strategy, and are not treated with the anti-radicalization measures. Departing from a view that the radicals do not fit a certain psychological profile it is pointed out that the Eu concept builds on the following "…'the decision to become involved in terrorism varies from one individual to another, even though the motives behind such a decision are often similar' (EC, 2005)"[22]. Apart from that, the documents do not develop guidelies that aim to influence psychological variables that can contribute to radicalisation, which is noted to be very hard, but propose that the EU can invest in knowledge abut the influence of psychological characteristics on radicalization. On an individual level the decisions are to a great extent based on the personal experiences that influence the way people react to their social environment and can lead to radicalization but – although the EU emphasizes central role of certain motives in the process of radicalization – psychological characteristics and personal experiences are not mentioned as distinguished causes in the relation to the strategy of counter-radicalization. It is stated that:

 "7.4.3. Rationality

Individuals radicalize for different reasons, of which some are more conscious than others. Examples of intentions why people join a radical group include adventurous reasons, obtaining a specific identity, or ideological motivations. Therefore, the question arises whether radicalism is a product of rational choice. The authors of objective five argue that radicalization is usually a gradual process, and thus a state of mind, rather than a tool that is employed to achieve a goal. In its strategies, the EU indicates that an individual must take 'practical steps' to become involved in terrorism, and that 'the decision to become involved in terrorism is an individual one' (2005). However, despite the emphasis that is laid on the role of the individual in radicalization and terrorism, no mention is made of rational choice being a reason for radicalism in the strategies. Of course this factor is linked to the types of causes at the external level, i.e. political, economic and cultural causes"[23].

Bjørn Møller explains that terrorism as *Pathology* can be interpret as Aggression or as Evil. He sigles out Terry Eagleton's view that "in the so-called war against terror, 'evil' is used to foreclose the possibility of historical explanation" – since

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22 Ibidem, p. 22.
23 Ibidem, p. 23.

an explanation may become exculpation ("Reasons become excuses")[24]. Agres-sivenes is, as stated by Møller, often ascribed to frustration, and the stance that frustration and anger among youth in the Third World emerges as a reaction to to the different living conditions compared to those observable via mass media is consequently marked as acceptable, which is accompanying effect of globalization which makes the comparison possible. Additionaly, in the terminology of Johan Galtung aggression can be explained as a reaction to "structural violence" (what Ted Gurr calls "relative deprivation"); via cathegories of alienation and feelings of marginalization (Melvin Seeman ascertains: feelings of powerlessness, mean-inglessness, normlessness, cultural estrangement; self-estrangement and social isolation); that Frantz Fanon described similar emotions as product of colonialism, accompanied with inferiority and self-estrangement that cause violence – but such that posseses an emancipatory effect[25]. A terrorist feels alienated from society and regards him/herself as victim of an injustice – a feeling of beig deprived ofoe's own rights resulting in violence in the form of terrorism as "the empowerment of marginalized men"[26]. While Marc Sageman sharply suggests that the hypothesis that frustration leads to aggression is insufficiently established and vague[27] and that "two elements of authoritarianism – uniformity within the group and the out-ward aggressiveness – may be the product of the intensity of relationshiops wihin the activated clique, which is a group phenomenon, rather than a measure of an authoritarian personality"[28].

24 Otherwise: "Much more often, however, what is commonly held to be evil (perhaps even labelled 'evil' by the culprit himself) could be seen as a protest against something believed to be evil"; "Robert J. Lifton's concept of 'doubling', i.e. the (more or less conscious and deliberate) creation of another self, capable of 'heroic cruelty'…"; that the examples of modern terrorism sometimes indicate human activities that point to complete sadism, the psychopathological indifference to the suffering of others – when evil behavior can be interpreted as an extreme case of rational choice. See closer Møller Bjørn, op. cit., 5.3.1: Terrorism as Evil.

25 Møller Bjørn, op. cit., 5.3.2: Terrorism as Aggression, pp. 38-39, points out factors that enables aggression: "the establishment of a psychological distance, e.g. by dehumanising the target. Killing in groups is also easier than doing so in isolation, hence the importance of group cohesion and/or discipline".

26 It is note, Ibidem, p. 40, Mark Juergensmeyer's statement that accentuates of symbolic expressions of violence – that do not lead to conquests of territory in the traditional definition of military success – success of terrorist(s) is the fact that they took the fight, confirmation of the trust that they get as "soldiers for a great cause".

27 Mark Sejdžmen, op. cit., p. 84: "The operations of global jihad are long devised and often well-planned… long term is not consistent with the known flexibility of human emotions, which can quickly change. General condition of frustration could possibly lead to aggression, but each reflective aggression is difficult to specifically explain the frustration".

28 Ibidem, p. 135.

Though it may be marked as an epistemological standpoint of anthropological pessimism (reductionism and instinctivism) – whose ultimate theoretical outcome may be a simplification of understanding terrorism as a manifestation of a pathology inherent to human nature – the determinants of terrorism include the *mechanisms of human destruction*[29]. With a reference to a suggestion that terrorism "is often the binding link between the different personalities"[30] and that aside from the results of socio-psychological study of terrorism too little is known about causality, it can be stated that aggression – destructive and not "selfconfirming" – cannot be excluded from the analysis as the characteristics of a terrorist mind. That supports reflections on destructive impulses and deepest psychological mechanisms inherent to man which, *in certain social conditions,* give motion to or produce almost incomprehensible forms of inhuman treatment and violence of man over man[31]. They are marked as irrational or illogical. This causes tight coupling of functional mechanisms of terrorism with an ethical perspective[32]. This is, in turn,

29 Here we only refer to: Kaplan Jeffrey, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma" and "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: Part II", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume II, Issue 2.

30 Von Hippel, 2003, according to: Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk, p. 12.

31 The above paragraph draws attention to the fact that *structural* factors can create an environment in which crimes are registered that demonstrate destructive elements of human nature, which themselves are manifested as irrational. A more radical stance is Јевтовић Зоран, *Масмедијски преображај тероризма и религије у глобалном поретку,* http://www.ceeol.com/ aspx/issuedetails.aspx? Issueid =41ad38df-f3f5-4fc3-aad7-d1894c83aca8&articleId=108e5194- 1d91-4875-accd-e98b1445dfdf*,* 30.04. 2015. (Translated Title: Massmedial Transformation Of Terrorism And Religion In TheGlobal Order. Publication: The Politics and Religion Journal - Serbian Edition, 1/2007), p. 119: "Some sociologists argue that terrorist cult of death has nothing to do with political objectives, explaining that this is the kind of satisfaction that the killer experiences while killing the victims. The essence of the act is in the feeling of complete freedom from human nature, since the killing of children and women is a culmination of inhumanity and beheading live on the Internet is primitive sadism".

32 Crenshaw Martha, "Decisions to use terrorism: psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning", in *Terrorism studies: a reader*, edited by John Horgan andd Kurt Braddock, Routledge, London and New York, 2012, p. 253: "The sharpest and clearest aspect of the believs that my be conductive to terrorism is identification and characterization of the enemy. In a pattern that is typical of much social conflict, the enemy is portrayed as an undifferentiated and monolithic entity… The steretipical enemy is both unrelentigly hostile and morally corrupt… The self/image of the terrorist is ambivalent, even contradictory. Terrorists need to see themselves as doing good, to justify their actions, and to maintain morale. Consequently 'auto-propaganda' my be more critical to group servival than are attemps to persuade external audiences, whether governments, constituencies, or likeminded groups (Cordes, 1988). The users of terrorism often see themselves as victims, but also as an avant-qarde acting on behalf of victims of injustice".

associated with counterterrorism strategy[33]. We must not leave out of focus that with socialization we adopt normative system, ie, standards that define acceptable options of social action. Norms rest on values – which are, in turn, defined as eferential within a broader conceptual context connected with the structural determinants. Our understanding of reality – based on narrow experience and interests, is basically determined by the underlying understanding of normality – and therefore our understanding of rational action (as thoughtful, reasonable, normal) can be insufficiently capable of understanding the deepest reasons that determine the behavior of others, as well as the objectives of their acts. We need to be able to, avoiding limitations of our own view, interpret fanaticism of others – which is usually irrational from the standpoint of our principles and values and at the same time perfectly rational in the thought and value system of the other – because it is the only way to define adequate countermeasures[34].

It is useful to recall how some authors touch upon the phenomenon of terrorism by considering the *category of happiness*. Happiness is defined as something "that permeates everything one feels, thinks and works, which is embedded in almost all domains and aspects of personality" and that indicates that "basic values of the consumer society have limited significance for human happiness"[35]. The psychological profile of a happy man can be the basis for building of a psychological profile and motives of terrorist(s)[36]. The authors examine "whether an individual

33 Stohl Michael, op. cit., pp. 7-8: "The psychological costs that an actor can expect from perpetrating violence on an incidental, instrumental, victim involves two conjoining factors. The first factor is the extent to which human life is valued (or conversely, the strength of internalized prohibitions against violence in general). The second is the extent to which the victim can be or has been dehumanized in the mind of the violent actor. Where moral/normative prohibitions are weak and especially where victims can be viewed in other than human terms, the self-imposed costs of terrorist actions are apt to be low and hence the choice of terrorist actions more frequent (Duvall and Stohl, 1983, p. 209). The extent to which victims and potential victims can be dehumanized is affected by two important variables... The first is the perceived social distance between the government and the victim population. The second is the extent to which action is routinely and bureaucratically authorized, so that personal responsibility is perceived, by all actors in the decisional chain, to be lower for governments (I) in a conflict situation with those they define as "inferior" and/or (II) with a highly bureaucratized coercive machinery".

34 On the concept of fanaticism see closer: Ђорић Марија, *Екстремна десница: међународни аспекти десничарског екстремизма*, Удружење „Наука и друштво Србије", Београд, 2014., pp. 49-52.

35 Kostić Petar, Flere Sergej, Lavrič Miran, "Psihometrijska struktura ljudske sreće", *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini*, XXXVI / 2007, pp. 163-178.

36 Ibid, pp. 166-167, refers that "six factors are extracted". Ibidem, p. 173: "We conclude that a happy mood is not a passive expectation of divine providence, but actively searching for meaning of one own's life that sometimes in young idealists implies radical behavior, and even sacrificing

can consciously sacrifice one own's and randomly take someone else's life to be happy" with the ultimate aim to answer the question: "is there an expected, but a happy death?". In response to the aforementioned question, authors depart from the critique of theoretical approaches that interpret terrorism as psychopathology – and then present their findings based on empirical indicators[37]. Categorical and methodological instrumentarium of psychology, together with the political aspect, is inevitable in this discourse for understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism[38]. Marc Sageman essentially operationalize the category of happiness when treating the reasons for joining Salafistic Jihad terror network, concluding that "it is difficult to imagine people satisfied with their own life would join the terrorist movement of religious renewal"[39].

4. MESO LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Martha Crenshaw states: "Terrorism per se is not usually a reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society... terrorism is an attractive strategy for small organizations of diverse ideological persuasions who want to attract attention for their cause, provoke the government, intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy, impress an audience, or promote the adherence of the faithful"[40]. While Luis de la

own life. Suicide terrorists are certainly not sick in idiosyncratic (clinical) sense, and everything else is axiological and/or political issue".

37 See closer Ibidem, p. 172, in relation to the views of Виноградов (2006). Ibidem: „... feeling of subjective well-being negatively correlates with all indicators of psychopathology".

38 Ibidem: "... the establishment and defense of own beliefs, and willingness to take risks are... indicators of happiness... Not a small number of surviving witnesses of suicide terrorist attacks confirms that the suicide bombers, whose faces they were able to see, were full of optimism at the time of death and, surprisingly, in the joyful mood. Let there be no doubt of this data, we factor analyzed the seven sacrifices (life is one of them) in the name of religion... and found that all seven almost equally saturate only one factor, bigotry, which explains two-thirds of the variance, and linear correlation between the total score of happiness and willingness to, in the name of religion, take one's own life is not convincingly high, but it is important".

39 Mark Sejdžmen, op. cit., pp. 82-84: "Islam was a way to regain their dignity... the lack of employment must have been a definite cause for resentment and frustration of these otherwise talented individuals. This supports the thesis of relative poverty as the root of terrorism. These, however, were temporary circumstances that led to their accession to the jihad, rather than a structural relative poverty milieu from which they derive. These individuals had higher expectations than the family of origin... future Mujahideens have suffered from social isolation, spiritual emptiness (which is an incentive to increase their devotion)".

40 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., p. 111. Likewise, Crenshaw Martha, "Decisions to use terrorism: psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning", op. cit., p. 250: "Terrorism is often considered the result of a strategic choice based on instrumental reasoning

Corte, from the perspective of social psychology, sets „First psychosocial principle: terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome but as a method of social and political influence"[41]. Terrorist activities are not interpreted as a direct effect of social determinants or psychological predispositios, but rather as interactive processes that can be strategically shaped by the terrorist organizations. Terrorist activities are method for minority groups to clearly and effectively expose their positions, draw attention to certain problems, publish their political or religious demands – influencing majority to take into consideration their views related to the political or religious questions. In other words, to achieve social change[42]. Second principle is worded that „the attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interaction"[43].

(Crenshaw 1990; DeNardo 1985). In this perspective, terrorism is analyzed as a form of political violence designed to affect the attitudes of specific audiences whose reactions determine political outcomes. Terrorism is interpreted as a calculated course of action, chosen from a range of alternatives according to a ranked set of values. The efficacy of terrorism as a means of political influence is assumed to be the primary criterion of choice. Decision makers in the organizations that use terrorism are supposed to rely on explicit strategic conceptions to guide group behavior. These conceptions then become the focus of analysis. To explain a particular terrorist action, one asks what strategic purpose it was meant to accomplish. Like all rational choice explanations of political action, this one is incomplete. My intention is not to contest the premise that terrorism is often strategic behavior, but to describe possible psychological barriers to purely strategic calculation in underground organizations. Psychological factors influence both the initiation and the conduct of terrorism and may be the source of actions that are incomprehensible if interpreted strictly as external goal-oriented behavior. We may be misled if we assume that such outcomes are the result of deliberate choice. Psychological interaction within underground organizations can provoke groups to action that is counterproductive in terms of long-terms goals. Although psychological factors may occasionally reinforce the grounds for decision that are instrumentally based, they may also interface with strategic calculation of ends and means. I ask how group dynamics and collective belief systems influence the use of terrorism by making it possible, motivation it, determining its forms, and instigating its escalation or decline".

41 Luis de la Corte, op. cit.

42 An interesting illustration would be linked to the PKK, see closer: Dragan Simeunović, op. cit., p. 187.

43 Luis de la Corte, op. cit., recalls that the psychological characteristics of individuals are result of socialization process, and the process of joining the terrorist group strongly influenced by the prevailing political and social conditions that individuals share with the family (cousins) and friends – along with another group of variables concerning the socialization experience before joining the terrorist activities (growing up in an environment marked by radical ideas and values, education in certain madrassas, participation in the activities of certain radical mosques). Joining a terrorist group is also a result of contact with people of extreme political or religious ideas. Luis de la Corte points out that psychosocial perspective also emphasizes the importance of "secondary socialization" – processes of indoctrination (similar sectarian groups) which exposed members by entering into a radical organization.

As one of the causes of emergence, existence and development of terrorism one can detect the problem of identity (its construction and preservation, as well as identity crisis), *therefore we can understand terrorism as a method of action which is perceived and accepted as a sole means of defending identity by certain groups and organizations.*

From the perspective of social psychology – the theory of social identification – Šijaković Ivan points out: that the process of obtaining personal identity (uniqueness, distinctiveness, diversity, manifesting the power of self-affirmation) is partly unconscious; that it is "one of the most important, psychological and social, drivers of human activities"; that the identity resting on the integrity "associated with a feeling of safety, reliability, belonging and trust"; that a person accepts the values of certain groups in social interactions, winning the trust through a process of identifying with the group. In the process of forming, positioning and maintenance of collective identity a key place is occupied by the relationship 'we – they' (with accompanying polarization of attributes which are ascribed to the other group by the members) – which "encourages the homogenization of the group and respect for the leader's authority, strengthens fighting spirit and willingness to take action". Collective identity forms a common awareness about the situation and "actors and intentions of 'them' versus ''us'…". There is more room for emergence of terrorism if "a collective identity makes sense only if it is clearly distinct from 'others', if it is 'unique', if it can not be integrated into the wider whole, and thus 'lose' its uniqueness". Identity crisis leads to radical means and violence alsobecause the goal of terrorists is to "draw public attention to the state of, position and problems of some social groups and to place them at the forefront as compared to all the other problems". Šijaković also points that "the establishment of the balance and articulation of different forms of belonging present a temptation, and display the ability and power of each individual to find one's own way of maintaiing one's 'self'". [44]

The effective counterterrorism policy must be directed towards the creation of such a social and political environment that builds and encourages socialization processes that balance and harmonize cognitive and valuable patterns of different social identities. The need of consideration the phenomenon of terrorism in terms of the problem of identity becomes more significant when this dimension we put in the context of broad framework of counterterrorism policy[45].

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44 See closer: Šijaković Ivan, "Terorizam i problem identiteta", *Sociologija*, Vol. XLIV (2002), N° 3, pp. 241-254.

45 Zirojević Mina, "Terorizam kao nekonvencijalna pretnja bezbednosti", *Međunarodni problemi*, бр. 2-3, 2008, pp. 354-355, notes that: „… it is very hard to fight against terrorism

Luis de la Corte points out that terrorist organizations become defenders of the values and interests of ethnic or religious communities – through the psychological processes of collective identification and 'self-identification' – as depicted in the table below.

Effect	Explanation
Depersonalization	Terrorists tend to perceive themselves as interchangeable members of an organisation. This motivates terrorists to give preference to the interests and goals of the organisation
Social cohesión	The collective identity shared by members of terrorist organisation promote positive relationships among them, which increases intragroup cohesion and cooperation
Conformity, obedience	The greater identification with the terrorist organisation, the greater identification with the norms which rule the members' behaviour. Therefore, a reduction in disobedience and challenging the orders of their leaders.
Bipolar worldview	Identifying with their organisation and reference community motivates terrorist to develop negative prejudices about people from other communities. The world is divided between us and them. The responsibility of problems and injustices suffered by the terrorist's reference community may be attributed to another community who could play a scapegoat role.

Table 1.[46]

with stigmatization, because stigmatization and isolation feeding feeling that victims are among communities that provide support to terrorists. Since, generally, the issue is marginalized communities that their interests can not effectively represented at international level, either because they conflicted with incomparably powerful and more influential diplomatic opponents (like the Arabs in the conflict with Israel), either because they are so stigmatized that their voice is not heard properly, in such communities often exists a reasonable awareness that by the legitimate means they can not effectively fight for their goals. If legitimate paths are blocked, or at least exists attitude in the community that they are are blocked, there is a high probability that the communities resort to violence. Therefore stigmatization only further motivates terrorists and contributes to the spirit of 'martyrdom' and extreme repressive measures against the communities in which terrorism is rooted further antagonize the community and further assure them that they are on the margins and there is no way to articulate their problems on the diplomatic and legal plan".

46 Luis de la Corte, op. cit., Table 1: Psychosocial effects and relationship to social identity.

Bjørn Møller considers *Terrorist Groups as Strategic Actors,* those which defines achievement of their political goals by violent or non-violent means. When optionals violent strategies groups make the strategic choice of forms of violence: conventional war, guerilla war, *terrorism as a rational option under certain circumstances*, as well as combinations of the above. Møller notes that after choice of the strategy terrorists faced with the choice of tactics that determines the instruments (human resources, armaments and logistics); that the choice involves a calculation of costs (both in manpower, and financial), objectives to be achieved, capabillities and/or abilities of terrorist groups (depending on its size and organizational level) for performance of actions, method of execution, and (desired and possible) effects of actions.[47]

Terrorism is seen as *unconventional (or soft), specific and primary security threat* – because such a phenomenon characterized by intertwining of criminal activity and, on the other hand, sometimes objectively present and, regularly subjectively defined, the *legitimate aspirations.* With rightly have noted that "political motivations of terrorists produces effects in the field of fight against terrorism" because "the various national liberation movements, religious autonomy or those aimed at changing the political system in their countries, have programs that, when they would be implemented through institutions of system, that is through political lobbying, considered acceptable"[48].

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47 See closer: Bjørn Møller, op. cit., pp. 48-69.

48 Zirojević Mina, op. cit., p. 353. Ibidem, pp. 355-359, 365: „... Honderich considers that is necessary, because of methodological precautions, always retained an awareness that terrorists act criminally in terms of the methods used, but not all their political goals in themselves illegitimate, and that some of them can be met without the need to worsening violence... For some social groups, and even globally perceived groups, such as, for example, parts of some religious communities, lack of opportunities that through political participation, and through institutional mechanisms, articulates their political aspirations and development, can be a radicalization trigger... Therefore, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between forms of terrorism and its causes in the social structure, which can not be eliminated by repressive methods. Solving the problem of terrorism is probably possible only by addressing its causes... From the point of view of legitimacy, terrorism... often based on political aspirations and often legitimate aspirations, and very rarely on some kind of authentic and original destructive or criminogenic goals... willingness to sacrifice, and motivation that stems from the perception that the otherwise legitimate political objectives can not be achieved by a legitimate diplomatic and legal means, are characteristics that make terrorism a primary and most difficult solvable unconventional contemporary security threats".

5. MACRO LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Psycho-sociological approach contemplates about „terrorism as a reflection of various social dysfunctions or conflictive trends in the social system". The phenomenon of terrorism is viewed connected to its „*root causes*" (poverty, authoritarian and repressive regimes, or cultural and religious practices). It is estimated that the relation between these sociological variables and terrorist activities inconclusive, and „classifying these sources is difficult because terrorism is usually promoted by minorities and the perspective of terrorists often involves a severe distortion of social reality"[49].

Bjørn Møller assertions about global correlations of terrorism and its causes. Independent Variable are the distribution of income, inequality, *Human Development Index*, (three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living) and Political Rights and Civil Liberties (including Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, Functioning of Government, Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights). Møller states that "quite a few economic and political variables have been suggested by various authors as likely determinants of terrorism. Unfortunately, however, most of the hypotheses advanced about the reasons for a state's propensity for terrorism are either not supported by available empirical evidence, or even contradicted by it… no significant correlation between the variables, however plausible the causal links between them may appear"[50].

Macro level of analysis of (counter)terrorism Møller identified and the research of constituencies and environments, respectively, in research of support structures, attitudes, structural factors (economic, demographic, cultural, etc.). He notes that there is often considerable overlap between what is referred to as constituencies and environments of terrorism in the case of nationally-inspired terrorism, where terrorist groups tend to see themselves as the vanguard of the people living in a given territory. In the case of religiously motivated terrorism the overlap is less obvious – whereas terrorists see themselves as acting on behalf of transcendental authorities – which is complex in terms of counterterrorism policy. The problem is whether the terrorists have local support in terms of approving activities, tolerating the presence, providing refuge and shelter, as well as bases for recruiting supporters. For very small terrorist organizations that are both political parties is very important wider sympathy to their actions, but this is unlikely to be established

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49 Luis de la Corte, op. cit.
50 Bjørn Møller, op. cit., pp. 127-133.

universal formula for the connection between terrorists and their environment[51]. Møller points out the need of consideration the questions of support terrorists in regard to their targets: whether the military (which, he notes, strictly speaking, is not terrorism) or civilian[52]. He states that the greater the likelihood that structural characteristics, such as poverty, influence a much larger group (he accents rebel movements) than the small, according as the terrorist organizations[53]. Similar notes Marc Sageman:

"...about three-quarters of global salafi mujahideen came from higher or middle classes... Over 60% had some type of higher education that made them, as a group, more educated than the average citizen of the world... It seems that the mujahideen Salafists-globalists... aspired to rise above their socioeconomic backgrounds... they refuse the idea that ethnocentrism will produce terrorism... their cosmopolitan perspective does not fit in the argument that lack of knowledge and contacts with the Western world make a prerequisite for terrorism... In this sample, the data on socioeconomic affiliation and education of mujahideen contradict, in empirical sense, the widespread belief that terrorism is a consequence of poverty and lack of education... Jihad has been far from being the product of failed expectations. It is rather a result of rising expectations of its members"[54].

In the study „Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk" the authors indicate that the search for causes and causality is a central theme in all social sciences, in order to develop appropriate counter measure, and that the phenomenon of terrorism can vary different sets or levels of causes, with typical distinction between deep, intermediate and direct causes.

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51 In some cases, the database will be used for recruitment of terrorists, that does not mean that we can safely assume that terrorists represent or her own representative sample, usually are far from representative, although this varies from case to case. In the case of Palestine, there is a clear correspondence because they are religious movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and nationalist groups, who fight and have the strong support of the Palestinian electorate.

52 See closer: Bjørn Møller, op. cit., 7. The Macro-Level: Constituencies and Environments.

53 Ibidem, p. 7.

54 See closer: Sejdžmen Mark, op. cit., pp. 67-71. Otherwise, in "*Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk*", p. 11, the authors remind us of often-quoted work of Alan Krueger, Jitka Malečková, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" (2003), in which have stated that "any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak",that research has found that is the level of education of individuals involved in terrorism in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon is somewhat higher than average, and that the background of suicide terrorists covers all socio-economic layers of society.

Attention was drawn to the difference between *root causes (preconditions)* and *trigger causes (precipitants)*, that Martha Crenshaw causes of terrorism defined as follows: root causes as a factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run – trigger causes as a specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. Crenshaw states that is possible to distinguish different types of variables for further research. With the aim of outlining approaches suitable for the analysis of causes of terrorism based on a comparison of the various cases of terrorism she distinguishes patterns of causality distinguishing three groups of variables: strategic, structural and psychologic. A conceptual distinction is based on the separation of structural variables into *trigger causes* and *root causes* – that are "classified into enabling (or permissive) factors that provide opportunities for terrorism to occur, and situations that serve as direct motivations for terrorist campaigns"[55]. While Audrey Kurth Cronin's setting is "that the connection of hypotheses on the end or decline of terrorism to hypotheses on the causes of terrorism is a simplification"[56]. Cronin ascertains seven elements that can have an impact on the decrease or cessation of terrorist activities, individually or (more likely) in combination, and these are: capture or kill the leader, an unsuccessful generational transition, achievement of the cause, transition to legitimate political process, loss of popular support, repression, or transition out of terrorism into crime or insurgen-

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[55] See closer: *Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk*, pp. 5-8, 13-18.

[56] Ibidem, p. 26: "This critique is based on the argument that the decline of terrorism is brought about by an interplay between external and internal factors, which may be accidental or opportunistic and that "the process by which a terrorist group declines may be as much determined by innate factors as by external policies or actors" (Cronin, 2006:11) The focus on the role of external factors is argued to be brought about by government support for research that looks into how a government can affect a specific group and cause it to end the use of terrorism combined with much better access to empirical data on this subject than to data on other subjects, such as the internal dynamics of a group. (Cronin, 2006:14) The usefulness of analyses of the organizational dynamics of groups, which has been popular for many years in terrorism research is questioned on the basis of the development in means of communications and globalization leading to "decentralized, non-hierarchical cell structures" (Cronin, 2006:12) which may not be analyzable through established models on organizations... the nature of the grievances driving the terrorist group appears to have some influence on the space of time in which the group is capable of existing... ethnonationalist/separatist groups have a longer life span than groups based on other causes and Cronin argues that religiously motivated groups may be comparable to the ethnonationalist/separatist groups, however, it is too soon to draw conclusions. According to Cronin, previous research into identifiable cycles is of limited use with regard to decline in terrorism as well as statistical and mathematical analyses. Conflict theory framework is mentioned as a promising theoretical approach but yet untested in the area of decline. Studying terrorist groups in the context of social movements... may lead to rewarding insights with regard to the origins and development of groups but is deemed to have little to contribute with to the understanding of how they decline or end".

cy. Some of these factors are likely consequences of government measures, while others may be due to external factors, or be caused by internal, group factors. In Table 2 the causes of terrorism are ranking from more general to more specific:

No.	Root causes	Trigger causes
1	Rapid modernization and urbanization are strongly correlated with the emergence of ideological terrorism	Events that call for revenge or action (i.e. contested elections, police brutality, etc.)
2	Lack of Democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law is a precondition to many forms of domestic terrorism	Lack of opportunity for political participation
3	Historical antecedents of political violence	Concrete grievances among a subgroup of a larger population (articulated clearly by a leader figure)
4	Repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers	Importance of belonging to a strong group for development of personal identity
5	Perceived feelings of discrimination based on ethnic or religious origins	Peace talks

Table 2[57]

6. DIMENSIONS OF RATIONALITY: CORRELATIONS

Rationality of terrorist acting is comparable to the processes in other social fields[58], but it is also specific in many aspects: "Terrorism is neither an automatic reaction to

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57 Table taken from: Ibidem, p. 19.

58 Parsons Wayne, *Public policy: An introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*, Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, UK and USA, 1999, p. 277: "Human rationality is limited, therefore, in terms of: The incomplete and fragmented nature of knowledge; Consequences that cannot be known, so that the decision-maker relies on capacity to make valuations; Limits of attention: problems must be dealt with on a serial, one-at-a-time basic, since decision-makers cannot think about too many issues at the same time; attention shifts from one value to another; Human beings learning through adjusting their behavior in line with purposive goals; the powers of observation

conditions nor a purely calculated strategy. What psychological factors motivate the terrorist and influence his or her perceptions and interpretations of reality? Terrorists are only a small minority of people with similar personal backgrounds, experiencing the same condition, who might thus be expected to reach identical conclusions based on logical reasoning about the utility of terrorism as a technique of political influence. The relationship between personality and politics is complex and imperfectly understood. Why individuals engage in political violence is a complication problem, and the question why they engage in terrorism is still more difficult"[59].

The aspect of rationality is not only a fertile ground for theoretical debates because theoretical considerations are followed by practical consequences – hence, counterterrorism concepts depend on the understanding of the aspect of rationality[60]. Way of understanding the aspect of rationality determines the assessment of the risks of terrorism.

For instance, the ratio of terrorist activity is revealed in aspect: "Nye argues that terrorism is based on the fight for *soft* power. It aims at intimidating the opponents and at their will to fight back, on one hand, and to manufacture admiration at potential admirers and trigger their willingness to go the same way, on the other"[61]. The next dimension of rationality of terrorist activity is contained in the measure in which are established findings:

"Humans, like all primates, need to socially organize, lead and be led; however, notions of "charismatic leaders" going out or sending recruiters to "brainwash"

and communication limit this learning process; Limits on the storage (memory) capacity of the human mind; it can only think of a few things at a time; Human beings as creatures of habit and routine; Human beings with limited attention spans; Human beings as limited by their psychological environments; Initiated behavior and attention that will tend to persist in a given direction for a considerable period of time; Decision-making as also bounded by an organizational environment which frames the processes of choice. (Simon, 1957: 81-109)".

59 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., p. 106.

60 Stohl Michael, op. cit., p. 7: "In discussions of insurgent terrorists it is often remarked that these terrorists attempt to make themselves invulnerable. There are at least two means to this end. One is inaccessibility…The anonymity of refugee camps or urban areas, and physical mobility provide this inaccessibility for insurgent terrorists. Insurgents seek safe havens amongst supporters or within populations (or states) which are unwilling to confront them and make the calculation to acquiesce to the presence of terrorists within their midst. One of the key elements of any counterterrorism strategy is the struggle to convince populations that the costs of offering safe haven – or simply allowing safe havens – are greater than the cost of assisting governments in eliminating such havens".

61 Ђурковић Миша, *Русија и откривање меке моћи*, http://desnica.info/index.php/component/content/ article/48-Rusija-i-otkrivanje-meke-moci, 15.02.2014.

unwitting minds into joining well-structured organizations with command and control is grossly exaggerated. Standard counterterrorism notions of "cells" and "recruitment" – and to some degree even "leadership" – often reflect more the psychology and organization of people analyzing terrorist groups than terrorist groups themselves. Such "bureaucratic mirroring" is also evident in misguided policies grounded in the premise that simply presenting people with rational arguments and material incentives will lead them down the correct or better path. Most human beings are more interested in persuading themselves that they are right, whatever the evidence against them, than in finding out that they are wrong. They are more interested in victory than truth. And when was the last time rational argument or a buy-off offer convinced anyone you know to select the right (boy or girl) friend?"[62].

It is very questionable – and anyone can be used for manipulation – the statement that "human beings are unique because good arguments can convince some"[63]. The assumption that the man always acts completely rationally is hardly plausible. Blaise Pascal wrote that "in vain cries sense, it can not be the measure of things" and that the imagination "unlimited trial of the good and of the true, the just… imagination has all sorts of things; it creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is all the world and all"[64]. *The pathology of terrorism may not be primarily of individual nature but of social, and we should understand it as if the terrorists dreams have come true – their experience of truth and good, ideas of beauty, justice and happiness.* Clearly, it is the way to make their dreams come true, which not only criminogenic but unacceptable for civilization – because it does not have respect for life, and it destroys beauty, justice and happiness of others.

The availability of alternatives (eg, employment or advancement) is important in the response to the question whether terrorism will occur as a rational choice. As well as parameters such as the risk of arrest and expected punishment – which are result from the strategic counterterrorism moves, ordinarily certain government. The external actors, such as donor country, can have an impact on the parameters.

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62 Atran Scott, "Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Volume II, Issue 5, March 2008, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/35/72, 15.04.2015., pp. 3-4.

63 Мајкл Игњатијев, "Слобода и Армагедон", in "Тероризам", *Нова српска политичка мисао*, Нова едиција, vol. XIV, no. 1-2, 2007, p. 302. Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition (Translation of essays: "Freedom and Armagedon" in Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Prinston University Press, 2004, pp. 145-171.).

64 Paskal Blez, *Misli I*, ВИГЗ, Beograd, 1980, pp. 57-59. Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition. Please refer to the bibliography for further details.

The terrorists deal with "strategic games" that can be analyzed using game theory game theory.[65]

Cost-benefit analysis is constantly present[66].

Therefore, on the basis of some presumptions of the *game theory*[67], without pretence for theoretical completeness, we conceptualize several propositions tied to the aspect of rationality terrorist acting:

Terrorists rationality is always contextual rationality, and it is related to their immediate and wider base of support, political and international environment. Therefore, the aspect of rationality in the terrorist phenomenon can be comprehended in a different way, for example that covers conceptual frame of *the achievable*:

"In seeking to maintain or alert some putative norm, dissidents may have so little popular support in the country as a whole (e.g., the United Kingdom in the case of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) and/ or such determined opposition from state officials that the dissidents come to perceive violence as the only means of realizing that goal. However, the amount of popular support and official opposition depend not just on the evaluative standards of the public and/ or officials but on the extent to which they view the dissidents' goal as realistic. They will not view the goal as realistic if they are baffled by related statements. Contemplate the characterization of terrorists in West Germany (see Becker 1988, p.24) of themselves as fighters for "the uprooted masses" of the Third World. Even if officials should agree that West Germany is responsible for the plight of Third World countries, they are unlikely to know what would satisfy the terrorists"[68].

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65 See closer: Bjørn Møller, op. cit., 5.2: Terrorism as Rational Choice.

66 Stohl Michael, op.cit., p. 6: "The underlying argument was that state decision makers pursued what Weiner (1972) refers to as an 'Expectancy X Value' theory or expected utility theory of motivation in which 'the direction and intensity of behavior is a function of the expectation that certain actions will lead to the goal, and the incentive value of the goal object'. The argument assumes that an actor behaves in accordance with a basic calculation which consists of three main elements: (1) the benefits, that the actor would receive from some desired state of affairs; (2) the actor's beliefs about the probability with which the desired state of affairs would be brought about if the actor were to engage in a particular action; and (3) the actor's beliefs about the probable costs, or negative consequences that it would have to bear as a result of its engaging in that action. It assumes therefore that the greater the relative expected utility of terrorist action for an actor as compared to other forms of governance, the greater is the probability that the actor will engage in terrorist action".

67 See: Стојановић Божо, *Теорија игара – елементи и примена*, Службени гласник, Београд, 2005.

68 Gibbs P. Jack, op. cit., p. 72.

Or to extract conclusions Martha Crenshaw:

- "Psychological considerations may also explain the particular form terrorism takes. Hostage taking, for example, can be interpreted rationally as a form of coercive bargaining, a means of compensating for the greater power of governments, since weakness is not a disadvantage in situations of blackmail (Crenshaw 1990). Yet, it is also possible that a desperate need to free imprisoned comrades genuinely motivates hostage taking... Dependence on the group and its leaders, fear of a hostile government, or survivor guilt, may combine to make hostage takers feel desperate. Hostage taking may also be a search for recognition by the government, a result of the terrorists' collective self-image as powerless victims (Knutson 1980)"[69];

- "Significant campaigns of terrorism depend on rational political choice. As purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of an organization's decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government. The argument that terrorist behavior should be analyzed as "rational" is based on the assumption that terrorist organization possess internally consistent sets of values, beliefs, and images of the environment. Terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means to advance desired ends. The terrorist organization engages in decision-making calculation that an analyst can approximate. In short, the terrorist group's reasons for resorting to terrorism constitute an important factor in the process of causation"[70];

- "Terrorism is the result of a gradual growth of commitment and oppositions, a group development that furthermore depends of government action. The psychological relationships within the terrorist group–the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilt, revenge, and isolation–discourage terrorists from changing the direction they have taken. This may explain why–even if objective circumstances change when, for example, grievances are satisfied, or if the logic of the situation changes when, for example, the terrorist are offered other alternatives for the expression of opposition–terrorism may endure until the terrorist group is physically destroyed"[71];

Dimension of rationality in the terrorist phenomenon is determined by the process aspect – including the fact, that is, the need of a terrorist organization that rational

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69 Crenshaw Martha, "Decisions to use terrorism: psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning", op. cit., p. 256.
70 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., p. 103.
71 Ibidem, pp. 111-112.

terrorists overcome irrational. Counterterrorism modus defines understanding of these circumstances and *vice versa*[72].

Social psychology also research organisational aspects in the terrorist phenomenon, therefore "seventh principle: the activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal features of their organizations", and and understanding the basics of terrorism is a principle that "terrorist organisations can be analyzed by analogy with other social movements"[73]. Principle recognizes connections organisational structure and its impact on group dynamics. Emphasis on organisational dimensions helps that "according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2003), many contemporary terrorists have adopted more flexible organisational models which also are better adapted to the strategic and tactical demands of transnational terrorism campaigns"[74].

 Principle organizational. Emphasis on organizational the factor of efficiency of operation of terrorists - of particular importance is the conclusion that "according to

Bjørn Møller also analysis *social movements and organisations*:

- Ian Lustick coined the term "*solipsistic terrorism*" to label terrorist activities as "introverted", those that strenghten cohesion of the group (in relation to the opponents) – an important term as it rectifies approach of the strategic (rational) choice. Although Lustick proposes other terms (egocentric, selfish, or "inward-looking"), he states that the term is important as it reminds us that not all activities of a

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72 What is obvious when we read, Stern Džesika, *Ekstremni teroristi*, Aleksandria Press, Beograd, 2004, pp. 176-177: "The traditional response to the threats in that emerges risks and uncertainties is the following: to convince opponents that it is better not to go on the attack, as they will get hurt... such a strategy requires to have information about the opponent's motivation and about his abilities... It is difficult to act preventively or deterring an opponent who does not behave rationally… motivated terrorists, by the fact that they are, are not rational participants in the political arena... Terrorists motivates something other than the desire to have a good calculation between cost and benefits... Individual motivation of each individual as a terrorist, and the dynamics of their group, can lead to specific acts of violence that are consistent with their declared objectives... Deterrence requires us to understand what the opponent is precious, and, in particular, what is the opposition leader, personal, the most precious... for deterrence is necessary to have accurate and reliable information on the enemy... The best answer is, threaten very strong response, but not specify". Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition of the monography. Please refer to the bibliography for further details.

73 See closer: Luis de la Corte, op. cit.

74 Ibidem: "There are two main structures of terrorist organisations (De la Corte, 2006). The first type is a more or less hierarchical one, as in the case of terrorist groups such as the IRA or the Italian Red Brigades. The second structure is much less hierarchical and much more flexible and decentralized… The hierarchical structure involves stronger leadership and control over the organisation and ensures a greater compliance to the operational guidelines and order which emanate from the highest positions in the organisation".

terrorist group (or any social actors) means directed towards accomplishing the end objective. Also he states that "*solipsistic*" efforts strengthen group – if it is more likely to be implemented by groups are more likely to grow, remain coherent and stronger resources;

- Social movements act in a competitive eniroment, where they must mutually compete considerig costs and requirements of public image building – therefore, it is possible to analyse them in line with the rules and dynamics of "the market". Møller emphasizes that Charles Tilly concluded that "movement must convey the message (both to their own supporters and to potential recruits) that they are "WUNC", i.e. worthy, unified, numerous and committed", that his process may require "mystification" and that abovementioned four components do not always go togethe;

- The way for a social movement to improve its resources is to form an alliance with other movements, including the reconciliation of differences: it is sometimes necessary to formulate again the key questions, which can lead to a gradual transformation in terms of objectives, strategies and composition;

- Terrorist organization must have an internal division of labor, defined branch and the chain of command, functional roles (sometimes similar to any organization) that are arranged in a hierarchical manner[75],– where the criminogenic nature of terrorist groups dictates the need for secrecy and security as top priorities.[76]

Luis de la Corte also stablished principle that "every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect"[77]. He asserts that according to the most influential theoretical model in contemporary social sciences – *Rational Choice Theory* – individuals, organisations and social movements consistently choose acts that they consider to be the most effective method to fulfill objectives according to the situation within which they act, where human rationality tends to be almost perfect. Therefore, terrorist also perceive themselves as rational actors, who adapt strategy to the specific situation. Meanwhile, "many investigations have showed that the rationality which guides human behaviour is rather limited and imperfect" – whereas people are not able to anticipate perfectly or realize all the consequences of their actions – consequently terrorist assessments cannot be completely accurate. Luis de la Corte

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75 If we remind ourselves of the Marc Sageman's analysis of terrorist networkwe cannot accept this statement, in the sense of universality.

76 See closer: Bjørn Møller, op. cit., 6.3 Terrorist Groups as Social Movements and 6.4. Terrorist Groups as Organisations.

77 Luis de la Corte, op. cit.

draws attention to: "Second, the emotions (anger, desire for revenge, hatred, etc.), ideological motives, and other psychological elements could influence the terrorist's subjective perspective in the sense to distort their expectancies and their reflections about the result of their violent actions… terrorists tend to overestimate their chances of success and sometimes have problems recognizing the ineffectiveness of their actions". Moreover, terrorists sometimes underestimate the negative reaction of their actual or potential supporters to their most brutal attacks. The rationality of individual actors' is limited, but the rationality of collective actors is a greater problem. Ratinality of terrorist acts is limited by their individual psychological attributes, as well as characteristics, group dynamic within terrorist organisations that effect decision-makig proceses, and by the fact that "groups tend to polarize attitudes and decisions to a greater extent than individuals"[78].

It is neccessery to take into account: "The more amiability and esprit de corps among the members of an individual group of policy-makers, the greater is the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink. (Janis, 1982: 245) The sense of being a cohesive group increases the likelihood of it developing irrational fears of those that are 'not one of us'...."[79].

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[78] Ibidem: "Sometimes this group polarization effect promotes highly risky actions (Myers, 1978). Terrorist cells exhibit the same conditions which facilitate group polarization. For instance, during certain periods, terrorists tend to reduce drastically their contact with people who do not embrace their similar extremist ideology. Furthermore, terrorists are frequently subject to strong discipline. Both factors also could promote 'groupthink'. The social psychologist Ervin Janis (1972) coined that expression to define the dynamic of interactions which have caused some serious decision-making mistakes made by important political or military committees during the last century. Several researchers have applied the concept of groupthink to their explanations of different cases of terrorism. Other group aspects that facilitate terrorist activities concern: the norms and roles to which terrorists use to adjust their behaviour; the influence exerted by group leaders; and the material benefits and psychological rewards associated with the terrorist's militancy. Finally, research on social influence, persuasion and changing attitudes show that reasons which people use to justify some of their actions are actually only developed after such actions haven take place (see Briñol, De la Corte and Becerra, 2001). Aronson (1972) coined the term "retrospective rationality" to design this tendency which has been demonstrated by several experiments. Furthermore, the same trend has been identified as a thought pattern frequently applied to justify collective and organisational actions (Pfeffer, 1998). In a similar way, some of the "reasons" that terrorists use to justify their activity could be mere rationalizations. Alonso and Reinares have found evidence that supports the rationalization hypothesis in their studies of IRA (Alonso, 2003) and ETA terrorism (Reinares, 2001)".
[79] Parsons Wayne, op. cit., p. 346.

Dipak Gupta (2005) considers the reasons behind engagement of people in the name of a group based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism or ideology, and put accent on economic and socio-psychological dimensions of human motivations, as well as a distinction between constructs that represent grievances and those that lead to violence. He points out that "[p]olitical violence takes place when a leader gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social construction of collective identity… political, economic and religious grievances are not in and of themselves factors which lead to terrorism", and that only activating of trigger mechanism leads to violence[80]. While Crenshaw Martha writes: "Because internal conflict threatens group cohesion and identity, leaders may try to deflect aggression onto external targets. For example, one reason for the creation of the Black September organization was apparently to absorb the intense frustration of younger militants over the Palestinian expulsion from Jordan in 1970. Arafat apparently decided to permit, if not direct, terrorism outside the Middle East in order to prevent internal dissent within Fatah"[81].

Operationalizing the prerequisites and mechanisms of group opinion is really beneficial for the analysis of process in terrorist groups, for example: "Jeanne Knutson (1980) effectively described the relationship between group pressures and rigid but subjective belief systems: 'Doubts are muted and are continuously atacked by the group, which employs great psychological pressure toward conformity. Basic concepts are challenged with great difficulty. … There is no real debate over primary assumptions' (p. 213). … She quoted one of her interviewees as admitting that 'we were increasingly losing our grip on reality' and that cutting off contacts with the outside world led to a 'group personality' with its own deadly internal momentum (pp. 213-214). She concluded, 'In such an atmosphere, group actions take on a predetermined, fatalistic quality in which *responsibility* for the occurrence of specific actions is progressively shifted onto the opposition players in the government, general social forces, or an inactive populace, and terrorist players come to experience themselves as quided by an externally perceived necessity'…"[82].

Knowledge of the mechanisms of group opinion is of importance for the analysis of possible modes of decision-making of the one who executes counterterrorism activities:

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80 Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk, pp. 7-8.
81 Crenshaw Martha, "Decisions to use terrorism: psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning", op. cit., p. 256.
82 Ibidem, p. 254.

"B-1 Structural faults of the organization: Allied to the concurrency seeking is a potent mix of structural faults in the way the group is organized: insulation of the group; lack of tradition of impartial leadership; lack of norms requiring methodical procedures; homogeneity of members' social background and ideology. B-2 Provocative situational context: To this mix of organizational faults add a provocative situation or decision which involves: high stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than that advocated by group leaders; low self-esteem temporarily induced by: recent failures that make members' inadequacies salient; excessive difficulties on current decision-making tasks that lower each members's sense of self-efficacy; moral dilemmas: apparent lack of feasible alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards. C Symptoms of groupthink: The observable consequences of these conditions are seen in three types of symptoms: Type 1: overestimation of the group: illusion of invulnerability; belief in inherent morlity of the group. Type 2: closed-mindedness: collective rationalizations; stereotypes of out-groups. Type 3: pressures towards uniformity: self-censorship; illusion of unanimity; direct pressure on dissenters; self-appointed mindguards. D Symptoms of defective decision-making: The manifestation of 'defective' decision-making which will result from groupthink encompass: incomplete survey of alternatives; incomplete survey of objectives; failure to examine risk of preferred choice; failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives; poor information search; selective bias in processing information at hand; failure to work out contingency plans. Groupthink is a model which fits well with the dynamics of small groups"[83];

Fight is a game for two, where each player obstructs the other one tending to win, and therefore each terrorists is likely to use (legal) restrictions in the activities of the opponent (the state), as well as to calculate the time factor, to secure the space for acting. The goal of counterterrorism is to stop terrorists, which is a prerequisite

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83 Parsons Wayne, op. cit., p. 346-347. Ibidem, p. 352:
"Concepts related to 'groupthink'
Cognitive dissonance
This theory was originally propounded by a student of Lewin, Leon Festinger (1957), as an explanation of how, even after a prophecy has failed, believers adapt their beliefs to fit with the failure of certain events to happen as predicted. He suggested that this condition is one in which there is a dissonance between one belief and another, beliefs are modified so as to reduce the dissonance by adopting strategies which involve changing one of the beliefs, downgrading the importance of a beliefs, or adding a new belief. As Janis notes, Festinger's ideas had a wide-ranging impact on social psychology. His earlier work had developed the theory of social comparison, in which he posited that people strive to verify their opinions and assumptions, and in group conditions people evaluate their judgements by comparing them with similar members of their group. Such comparison, Janis notes, produces considerable pressures to conformity in decision-making (Janis, 1982: 277)".

to avoid the aforementioned limitations and predict (to find out about) the moves of opponents;

Rationality of decision-making at terrorists (especially of an individual) is limited by their beliefs, and by psychological mechanisms that determine the ways of their materialization[84], expressed by volume and quality of information that terrorist(s) operate(s)[85].

Starting from the rational choice theory (primarily via the categories of economic theory), according to Bjørn Møller terrorism can be understood through consideration of advantages and disadvantages (that is, costs and benefits) of routes of specific actions, based on more or less adequate (available) information – therefore *terrorism is a phenomenon of instrumental rationality*. The question of whether it will become a choice in certain circumstances depends on personal preferences of the players, the range of options or strategies to achieve the goals, the probability of success of the given the option, expectations and comparative costs of alternative options, as well as the positive and negative side effects of different strategies. As it can be seen in the mathematical sense over the theoretical matrix as a "decision tree" that describes the expected utility of a terrorist act – which enables the prediction of their sustainability, as well as the choice of action form. Terrorism is a reflection of rational choice, in which terrorists can be hired, terrorism may be an opportunity for lucrative activities such as robbery and smuggling,

84 Crenshaw Martha, "Decisions to use terrorism: psychological constraints on instrumental reasoning", op. cit., p. 254: "Psychological research in different theoretical traditions suggests that individual beliefs are likely to be stable rather than volatile. Even greater stability should characterize collective attitudes that are constantly reinforced by group interaction. Theories of cognitive consistency indicate that individuals absorb only information that supports their beliefs, ignore disconfirming evidence, fail to recognize value conflicts, and neglect to reconsider decisions once they are reached... Furthermore, the nature of a belief system itself may preclude change. The least systematic beliefs are the most resilient, and the least empirically relevant are the most incontrovertible because they cannot be tested. Vague and distant long-term goals can be an advantage. 'True believers' are not by nature skeptical (Snow and Machalek 1982)".

85 Stohl Michael, op. cit., pp. 6-7: "When governments consider the costs of engaging in terrorist behaviors, two kinds of costs can be distinguished, response costs and production costs. *Response costs* are those costs which might be imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or offended bystanders... What others likely will do in reaction affects the utility of a particular strategy. Most relevant to a consideration of terrorism are what might be called punitive or retributive costs imposed by the target group and/or sympathetic or offended bystanders… *Production costs* are the costs of taking the action regardless of the reactions of others. In addition to the economic cost – paying the participants, buying weapons and the like – there is the psychological cost of behaving in a manner which most individuals, under normal conditions, would characterize as unacceptable".

a way to overcome a bad life or to reach "slave", compensation may be the thrill for some people derive from rape, torture and killing civilians (including sexual satisfaction)[86];

The goals of terrorists may be in conflict, which determines and limits the rationality of their action.

It is interesting to point out here how Marc Sageman analyzes rationalist paradox Mancur Olson free shooter, which is characterized by vulnerability of "widespread movement", which is characterized by a terrorist organization whose aim is to carry out a change of society, and indicating that "even if the terrorism rational strategy for the group as a whole, it is not the same for each of its members". He clarifies how cliques resolve the paradox, which defines the time that the most rational member organizations to stand back while the other members do not succeed and enjoy the benefit without direct involvement and possible personal loss[87];

The factor of rationality is also made of existing options, meaning: Has the terrorist organization or the terrorists been offered certain solution as the only possible solution. We start from Martha Crenshaw's arguments:

"… terrorism may serve internal organizational functions of control, discipline, and morale bulding within the terrorist group and even become an instrument of rivalry among fractions in a resistance movement… At least when initially adopted, terrorism is the strategy of a minority that by is own judgment lacks other means. When the group perceives its options and limited, terrorism is attractive because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential reward is high… In addition to weakness, an important rational in the decision to adopt a strategy of terrorism is impatience. Action becomes imperative. For a variety of reasons, the challenge to the state cannot be left to the future. Given a perception of limited means, the group often sees the choice as between action as survival and in action as the death of resistance"[88].

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86 Bjørn Møller, op. cit., 5.2: Terrorism as Rational Choice.
87 Mark Sejdžmen, op. cit., pp. 132-133: "The paradox Freelance imply that participation in terrorism must be not based on utilitarian calculations... suicide prevents to plan future joint activities... it looks like that suicide prevents the rationalist approach. Coterie resolve this rationalistic paradox... create a unique view of the world... those who are in focus on our own readiness to die... escape from egoism embodied in their conscious rejection of the possibility to be free riders put a semblance of virtue in the way they see themselves and their friends... progressively and smoothly over a period of time... positive emotions can motivate people to more easily perform many terrible things before, but it would have made negative emotions".
88 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., p. 105.

Bjørn Møller writes that we may affects on the choice of terrorism, as a strategic option, by reducing its relative attractiveness: by improving other career opportunities, jobs, creating ways for the resolution of complaints through support for democratization and human rights. He emphasizes that – although aforesaid counterterrorist measures appear acceptable (in the sense of effectiveness) – there aren't any available data that could test the proposed hypothesis.[89] Bjørn Møller also considers the problem of interaction of options of terrorists and counterterrorism measures:

"Just as few had expected an attack such as 9/11, it is entirely conceivable that terrorists may come up with an idea so diabolical that nobody else has envisioned it, and for which no active counters have therefore been planned. It is, of course, possible to prepare for any fi nite number of different contingencies, thereby forcing prospective terrorists to abandon plan A in favour of plan B, for which a defence should then also be prepared, etc. ad infinitum. However, there will always remain the "n+1 problem," i.e. the contingency for which no defence is in place and the likelihood that the terrorists will then seek to exploit this loophole. Th is does not mean that solving the "n problem" has been in vain as the aggregate and cumulative eff ect may be to reduce the total number of successful terrorist attacks which is surely also a meaningful objective, depending, of course, on the costs"[90];

Of importance is whether terrorists determined under conditions of uncertainty or uncertainty (changeable variables in the political environment and system), especially if they can assume the end of the game – to predict benefits of their activities – what counterterrorism policy can affect[91]. Related to the following:

"Economic theory argues that the theory of non-cooperative games is based on the two, as is usually the case, 'heroic hypothesis' (Mailath, 1998). The first one is about maximizing behaviour of rational decision-makers ('player') and the other one is on consistency – it is assumed that each player's expectations regarding the actions and behaviour of other players are not only correct but also stable. Therefore, the applicability of the theory of non-cooperative games in the analysis of specific problems depends on whether in the given situation these assumptions are meaningful or not. The assumption of optimization as a method of rational

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89 Møller Bjørn, op. cit., 5.2: Terrorism as Rational Choice.

90 Møller Bjørn, Security sector reform and the fight against terrorism, *DIIS Report* 2007:12, Danish Institute for international studies, Kopenhagen, http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/ Publications/Reports% 202007/RP_2007-12_web.pdf, 21.06.2014., p. 20.

91 White R. Jonathan, op. cit., p. 359, says that the battle "will be won when most people start believing that their interest is founded on the outcome".

individual choice is also reviewed within the theory of decision-making. For example, how can we define rational behavior of individuals in circumstances of uncertainty (regardless of the kind of uncertainty)?"[92]

Terrorism *always longs for the achievement of political goals, but it can also be expressed as an effective strategy* that allows the achievement of political goals, and here let me/us use the findings Martha Crenshaw:

"Saying that extremist groups resort to terrorism in order to acquire political influence does not mean that all groups have equally precise objectives or that relationship between means and ends is perfectly clear to an outside observer. Some groups are less realistic about the logic of means and ends than others. The leaders of Narodnaya Volya, for example, lacked a derailed conception of how the assassination of the tsar would force his successor to permit the liberalization they sought. Other terrorist groups are more pragmatic: the IRA of 1919-21 and the Irgun, for instance, shrewdly foresaw the utility of a war of attrition against the British, Menachem Begin, on particular, planned his campaign to take advantage of the "glass house" that Britain operated in. The degree of skill in relating means to ends seems to have little to do with the overall sophistication of the terrorist ideology"[93].

Notwithstanding terrorism is a political strategy "inappropriate to... social situation or historical possibilities of those who practice it"[94] one may note that *terrorist activities can have positive effects on the terrorist actors and can even create preconditions for reaching long-term goals* – at least reformulated, close or correspondent goals[95]. Therefore, the rationality of terrorist activity is evaluated *via*

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92 Стојановић Божо, op. cit., pp. 295-296.

93 Crenshaw Martha, "The causes of terrorism", op. cit., p. 104. Ibidem: "However diverse the long-run goals of terrorist groups, there is a common pattern of proximate or short-run objectives of a terrorist strategy. Proximate objectives are defined in terms of the reactions that terrorists want to achieve in their different audiences. The most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention what Thornton called advertisement of the cause. Violence and bloodshed always excite human curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense, and threat of danger inherent in terrorism enhance its attention getting qualities. In fact, publicity may be the highest goal of some groups... in an interdependent world, the need for international recognition encourages transnational terrorist activities, with escalation to ever more destructive and spectacular violence. As the audience grows larger, more diverse, and more accustomed to terrorism, terrorists must go to extreme lengths to shock".

94 Simeunović Dragan, op. cit., str. 80.

95 Levi Rozita i Pajović S. Slobodan, "Međunarodni terorizam i Latinska Amerika", *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. LIV, br. 1-2, 2002, p. 82: „Today, when the vast majority of Latin America's countries definitely stabilized and successfully develop its democratic institutions

factors of political time, changed circumstances and power relations, open per-spectives – a practice that sometimes indicates the effectiveness of choice of such a strategy[96]. Due to the above, certain considerations of terrorism are character-ized by contradictions and moral relativism. Like what Jurgen Habermas said in an interview in 2001:

"Terrorism belongs to a category different from the crime. It differs from private incident because deserves public interest... The difference between political ter-rorism and ordinary crime becomes clear at the time of the change of regime in which former terrorists come to power and become prominent representatives of their country. Of course, this only applies to the terrorists that the political goals of weight in a realistic way and are able to establish, if later, certain justification for their criminal actions"[97].

By reading the above quote we can choose between hypocrisy and bare efficiency (by reaching the legitimacy of action) as a principles of civilization, perhaps the

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almost all former revolutionary guerrilla groups or movements opted for the political struggle within the system against which they recently fought using terrorist methods. The first who opted for this step was the Venezuelan communists and guerrilla of Castroian orientation led by Teodor Petkoff who founded the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS)... the same road was taken by the members of the famous guerrilla movement M-19 from Colombia who participated in the presidential election and achieved a historic success by entering the government of the country. Legendary Uruguayan 'Tupamaros' joined the political coalition Broad Front (Frente Amplio) and today have their representatives in the parliament of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Similar phenomena have occurred in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and other Latin American countries".

96 Fernando Lopez-Alves (*Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Vruguayan Tupamaros*, 1989) conducted analysis of Tupamaros on an assumption of (high) rationality of their acting (not as a sign of weaknes) in accepting terrorism as a strategy „with a clear awareness that it must ultimately be abandoned afterwards". He argues that "terror, as used by the Tupamaros, expressed a clear response to governmental actions, was geared to cause changes in the environment, and, when the cost was too high, was abandoned for what seemed a more sustainable strategy". The Tupamaros recognized that they miss the support of the wider population, that prefered non-violent methods of solving problems – because "the political system has not yet exhausted its capacity to absorb and channel the citizens demands". From the perspective of counterterrorism it is of importance that the movement, when the cost-benefit ratio changed (in the favour of costs), divided into groups of urban guerrillas and terrorists and orientated toward guerrilla war – hence, the army was able to easily supress it – of note, the government measures were a combination of "carrot and stick". According to: Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risk, p. 33.

97 Хабермас Јрген, „Фундаментализам и терор", in „Тероризам", *Нова српска политичка мисао*, Нова едиција, vol. XIV, no. 1-2, 2007, p. 242 (Note: The quotes from this source are translated from Serbian edition of the monography: "Fundamentalism and Terror", in *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2003.).

"bare" realism as a theoretical perspective. In other words, the choice of alternatives: terrorism as a crime that "deserves public interest" or purposeful criminal actions if the actors "long for political objectives in a realistic way". By considering terrorism in this way, we also face the problem of "double standards" – recalling that the roots of political trends and problems are interests and power – and on the meta-theoretical level the ideal and forms of activism. The modalities are revitalized – more or less successfully built upon relativization and/or false dichotomy: liberation and crime, progressive and retrograde, causes and consequences, the goal and the means.

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Luis de la Corte, "Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach"*, Perspectives on Terrorism,* Vol 1, No 2, 2007, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/ view/8/html, 06.11.2014.

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RACIONALNOST U FENOMENU TERORIZMA I STRATEGIJA KONTRATERORIZMA

Apstrakt

U radu se istražuje iz kojih perspektiva, u kojoj meri, na koji način shvaćen, u kojim dimenzijama tumačen je terorizam kao strateški izbor političke borbe racionalan, kao i na koji način modaliteti razumevanja aspekta racionalnosti u fenomenu terorizma mogu uticati na koncepte kontraterorizma. Pošto je politička strategija (po kojem sledi taktički izbor metoda i sredstava) terorizam je fenomen koji mora biti određen aspektom racionalosti. Moguće je na različit način definisati meru uticaja elementa racionalnosti u ovom fenomenu ali ga nije moguće tumačiti jednodimenzionalno. Pitanje racionalnosti se može svesti na kategoriju interesa, ali se ova propozicija u kompleksnosti terorizma iskazuje kao vulgarizacija. Pokazano je da terorizam ima svoju unutrašnju logiku koja se prelama u njegovoj etiologiji, fenomeologiji i morfologiji – time u aspektu racionalnosti. Ova racionalnost je u isto vreme uporediva sa procesima u drugim društvenim oblastima, ali je u mnogim aspektima specifična. Aspekt racionalnosti je neraskidivo povezan sa uzrocima i motivacijom terorističke aktivnosti, kao i grupnom dinamikom unutar terorističkih organizacija. Postavke o uzrocima terorizma doprinose razumevanju aspekta racionalosti i utiču na kontrateroristički koncept, mada koleracije nisu jednostavne i direktne. Analiza je stoga obuhvatila i problem identiteta, promišljanje terorizma kao načina društvenog i političkog uticaja, kao i etičke aspekte (kontra)terorizma. Moramo biti u stanju da, izbegavajući sopstvenu isključivost,

tumačimo fanatizam drugih – koji je po pravilu neracionalan iz ugla naših principa i vrednosti a u isto vreme savršeno racionalan u misaonom i vrednosnom sistemu druge strane – jer je to jedini način da definišemo adekvatne kontra mere.

Ključne reči: uzroci terorizma, patologija ličnosti, grupna dinamika, socijalni identitet, agresija, troškovi i dobiti, uverenja.